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Local spillovers and learning from neighbors: Evidence from 
durable adoptions in rural China 
Abstract: Using the 1999 durable consumption survey data in rural China, we examine 
the importance of local spillovers in the diffusion of three major durable goods, i.e., color 
television set, washing machine, and refrigerator. We find that, with control for many 
family characteristics, a household is more likely to buy its first durable good in villages 
where a large share of households already own one. Further evidence suggests that theses 
patterns are unlikely to be explained by unobserved local characteristics. When examined 
in more detail, the extent of local spillovers appears to be negatively related to a 
household’s knowledge about the product, and positively related to its education level. 
Both are consistent with the hypothesis that learning from neighbors plays an important 
role of these spillovers. 
Keywords: Local spillovers, Social learning, Durable adoptions 
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1. Introduction 
When a new product is introduced to the market, potential adopters are generally 
concerned with its performance and reliability. Because of these uncertainties, potential 
adopters may postpone their purchases. These uncertainties can be effectively reduced 
when potential adopters are able to observe their neighbors using this new product and to 
know how they evaluate it. Therefore, one should expect that there be local spillovers 
from existing owners to new owners.1  
The situation of rural China in the late 90s provides a unique scenario to examine 
the diffusion of new products. For most rural households, their adoptions of electric 
appliances in the late 90s were the first purchases. By examining the likelihood of 
durable adoptions in rural China during 1998-1999, we find that households are more 
likely to buy their first color television set (CTV), washing machine or refrigerator in 
villages where a larger share of households already own one. 
However, this positive relationship may be attributed to the fact that households in 
the same village face similar economic environments or they have some characteristics in 
common. High adoption rates may reflect the existence of local durable-making firms or 
low local durable prices. Also, living in the same economic and social environment, 
neighbors may develop similar consumption preferences. This problem is pervasive in the 
empirical studies on network effects.2 Using additional control variables and instrument 
variable (IV) estimations, we find little evidence that this positive relationship is the 
                                                 
1 Network externalities may also contribute to these local spillovers. An increase in the number of users 
would lead to an increase in the value of a new product or lead to a development of its complementary 
service, thus stimulate its further adoption. 
2 See Manski (1993). 
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result of local common characteristics. 
As Manski (2000) points out, even with finding compelling evidence that behavior 
is correlated within groups (here within villages), one would like to be able to say 
something about the reasons for this correlation. The richness of our data enables us to 
further examine whether these local spillovers are related to learning from neighbors. For 
CTV adoptions, we find that, the local spillovers are stronger for households with no TV, 
compared to those who have owned a similar product, a black-white television set 
(BWTV). We follow the differences-in-differences approach, so are able to include 
village dummies to maximally control for the effects of correlated common 
unobservables. The above evidence supports the learning hypothesis in that there should 
be something new to learn in the first place.3 The social learning effect becomes less 
influential when potential adopters have already acquired relevant knowledge.  
We further examine the interaction effect of education level and local spillovers on 
the likelihood of adopting these three durables, respectively. Again, village dummies are 
included in the regressions. We find that the strength of local spillovers is positively 
related to a household’s education level – the better educated a household is, the more 
strongly the likelihood of its durable adoption is influenced by local ownership rates. This 
finding is consistent with the social learning hypothesis in that more educated individuals 
are more capable learners,4 thus more efficient to acquire information through learning 
from their neighbors. In summary, our study provides evidence not only on the existence 
                                                 
3 Similarly, Duflo, Kremer, and Robinson (2008) find that farmers in Kenya do not obtain information from 
their neighbors about fertilizer use because the existing technology at the time of study was not new.  
4  As raised by Schultz (1975), education enhances one’s ability to receive, decode and understand 
information. 
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of local spillovers in the diffusion of new products, but also on that education is 
positively related to the extent of these spillovers.  
Social learning and education level have been documented individually to stimulate 
new technology adoptions.5 However, there is little evidence on how education would 
influence the effect of social learning. As far as we know, our study is among the first to 
test and provide evidence on the interaction between education and local spillovers based 
on the social learning hypothesis. Although what we study is on new durable adoptions, 
our results may shed light on new technology adoptions.6 Given a higher complexity of 
new technologies, the spillovers in their diffusions might also be tied to the education 
level.  
The interaction effect between education and social learning with respect to new 
technology adoption may be important to growth. A poor country can accelerate its catch-
up by adopting new technologies developed in rich countries more quickly if the 
spillovers are stronger. Though it is unclear what the mechanism would be to induce the 
spillovers, social learning is a possible candidate.7 It is likely that schooling may augment 
the social learning, thus accelerating the catching-up process of a poor country. 
                                                 
5 For education effects, Abdulai and Huffman (2005) find that the likelihood of a farmer in Tanzania to 
adopt hybrid cow technology depended positively on his education level. Lin (1991) finds similar results 
for the diffusion of hybrid rice in China. Foster and Rosenzweig (1996) show that whether any family 
member has primary education is an important predictor of a household’s new farming technology 
adoption. By examining the adoption of four new technologies, hybrid corn, beta-blockers, tractors, and 
computers, across states in the U.S., Skinner and Staiger (2005) find that education and social networks are 
the only variables that are significant to explain the adoption rates for all these four innovations.  
6 It seems reasonable to make this extension. A new technology may be materialized as a new product, such 
as computer, ATM, software, and etc. A washing machine may be looked upon as a new technology to 
replace manual clothes-washing. With its adoption, the labor involved in washing clothes can be allocated 
to other production tasks. 
7 Lucas (1993) has realized the importance of social learning. He raises the following question and suggests 
to have it included in the growth theory, “Does learning accrue solely to the individual worker, manager, or 
organization that does the producing, or is some of it readily appropriable by outside observers?” 
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The rest of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. 
Section 3 describes data. Section 4 reports empirical results. Section 5 further discusses 
the mechanism behind the local spillovers. Section 6 concludes with policy implications. 
2. Related literature 
Evidence on the learning effect has been documented among new technology and 
product diffusions. In his pioneering study on the diffusion of hybrid corn in the U.S., 
Griliches (1957) finds evidence consistent with later adopters learning from early 
adopters. Foster and Roserzweig (1995) and Conley and Udry (2001) find that farmers 
learn from each other about new technologies, especially the knowledge on detergent use 
associated with the new breed. Munshi (1996) finds that the network effect on new 
technology diffusion is due to social learning. Using a unique dataset on sunflower 
adoption in Mozambique, Bandiera and Rasul (2006) document that, consistent with 
information sharing, the network effect is stronger among farmers who report discussing 
agriculture with others. There is also evidence from the empirical study in health 
economics, labor economics and industrial organization. By examining several 
competing antiulcer drugs, Berndt, Pindych and Azoylary (2003) find that the network 
effect due to information dispersion influences consumer’s choice and evaluation. 
Bertrand, Luttmer and Mullainathan (2000) find that information sharing influences 
individual participation on social welfare projects. Irwin and Klenow (1994) document 
the learning effect in semi-product industry. Thornton and Thompson (1998) examine the 
knowledge spillover in the ship building industry during the WWII. 
Our paper is also related to the literature on network effects. Much of this evidence 
relates to technology adoption by firms, including electronic table (Church & Gandal, 
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1992), digital-control machine (Karshenas & Stoneman, 1993), ATM (Saloner & 
Shepard, 1995), etc. In contrast, studies documenting network effects among consumers 
are few and far between. Among the few exceptions, Gandal (1994) shows that 
consumers were willing to pay a premium for spreadsheet software compatible with the 
Lotus platform and with external database programs; Goolsbee and Klenow (2002) report 
that people are more likely to buy their first home computer in areas where a high 
fraction of households already own computers; and Park (2004) finds that network 
externalities in video cassette recorders explain much of the dominance of VHS relative 
to Betamax. 
3. Data description 
 Data used in this paper mainly comes from an October 1999 survey of rural 
durable goods consumption conducted by the Rural Survey Organization (RSO), the 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China. We also use data from the RSO’s regular 
annual household survey of 1998. The consumption survey covered over 20,000 
households from all the Chinese continental provinces except Tibet. They were drawn by 
a stratified random sampling method from the RSO regular survey frame of about 68,000 
households. The purchases of 16 durables were investigated.8 We exclude from my 
sample the 0.7 percent of households with no power. Further removal of invalid 
observations leaves us with around 18,000 households. 
Our focus is on three major durables, CTV, washing machine and refrigerator. We 
treat the purchases of these three durables in rural China during the late 1990s as first 
                                                 
8 They were BWTV, CTV, washing machine, refrigerator, fan, radio recorder, camcorder, VCD player, 
camera, microwave, rice-cooker, air conditioner, pager, bicycle, automobile, and motorcycle. 
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purchases rather than replacements. When China started its reform in the early 80s, these 
durables were scarce even in urban area. Most rural households did not begin their 
purchases until the 1990s. In the survey, 97% of households reported their CTV 
purchases were within 10 years. This number was 91% for washing machine, and 96% 
for refrigerator. If the replacement cycle is around 10 years, assuming that these durable 
consumptions were first purchases seems reasonable.9  
(Table 1) 
Table 1 provides some summary statistics of these three durable consumptions, 
respectively. households are divided by their ownership status. For each durable, column 
(1) is for households who reported no adoption at the survey, and column (2) is for those 
who reported adoption since 1998. For completeness, column (3) is for those households 
who reported adoption before 1998. All three durable consumptions share the following 
characteristics. Compared to non-owners, owners were better educated, and earned higher 
income. As expected, these owners also enjoyed lower electricity prices, stronger 
television signals (for CTV), and having tap water (for washing machine). Moreover, 
new adopters since 1998 faced a higher village ownership rate than non-owners. In 
summary, the statistic summary suggests that household characteristics, public service, 
and lagged ownership rates may influence the adoption of these three durables. 
(Figure 1) 
                                                 
9 Owning more than one durable was minor. Take CTV for example. Only 3.2% of surveyed households 
reported the ownership of more than one CTV. They are excluded from our examination since we only 
have the information on the year of their latest CTV adoption. For this reason, 65 valid observations are 
deleted when we examine CTV adoptions. This number is 13 for washing machine, and 6 for refrigerator.  
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Figure 1 shows the spot and estimated linear relationship between CTV adoption 
rates since 1998 and the CTV ownership rates in 1997 at the county level. For those 
counties with higher ownership rates in 1997, their adoption rates are also higher. The 
OLS estimated coefficient is 0.60 (standard error is 0.05; t-value is 12.) This positive 
relationship also exists in washing machine and refrigerator adoptions. 
4. Empirical results  
4.1. Empirical specification 
We analyze the local spillovers on durable diffusion using cross-sectional linear 
probability (LP) regressions of household purchases. We follow the convention in the 
literature on the demand for durable goods (e.g., Dubin and McFadden, 1984; Farrell, 
1954) and treat the demand as a binary decision of buying or not. The extent of local 
spillovers is measured by the durable ownership rate at the village level since rural 
households interact with each other the most within a village. The estimation model is as 
follows. 
                   01( 1) %
u
it t i i iProb y village x x uλ β−= = + + + 。                              (1) 
( 1)itProb y =  is the likelihood of purchasing since year t for household i. 1%tvillage − is 
the village ownership rate at the end of year 1t − .10  Take CTV adoptions for example. 
We examine the likelihood of CTV adoption during the period starting at 1998 and 
lasting until the time of the survey. The dependent variable is a binary variable that 
equals one if a household purchased a CTV during this period, and zero otherwise. If 
                                                 
10 Using lagged, instead of contemporaneous, ownership rates to measure local spillovers helps to mitigate 
the identification problem raised by Manski (1993) as the reflection problem, i.e., while a household is 
influenced by its neighbors’ decisions, in turn, it influences their decisions as well. 
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there are local spillovers, with control for all other factors, non-owners in villages where 
owners are prevalent would be more likely to buy a CTV, that is, 0λ > . 
In equation (1), 0ix  is the vector of observed household and village characteristics. 
Household characteristics include net income per capita, average years of education, 
average age, family size and male ratio. Village characteristics include stability of the 
power supply (stable=1), access to a TV signal receiving tower (yes=1), TV signal 
strength (good=1), access to tap water (yes=1), and etc.11 uix  represents the unobserved 
characteristics, which are correlated with 1%tvillage − , but not with 
0
ix . iu  are the other 
unobserved characteristics, including those correlated with 0ix . 
Unobserved characteristics in uix  may lead to estimation bias. If 1%tvillage −  is 
positively correlated with uix , its coefficient λ would be overestimated. People in coastal 
area are more inclined to accept new stuff. Even though they may not have CTV at the 
moment, their propensity to adopt one is still higher. The failure to control for this 
common propensity would spuriously make the estimated local spillover larger. On the 
other hand, if 1%tvillage −  is negatively correlated with 
u
ix because of survivor bias, its 
coefficient would be underestimated. In either case, we should need instrument variables. 
4.2. Baseline estimation result 
We report in column (1) of Table 2 the baseline regression on the likelihood of CTV 
adoption since 1998. Some villages have fewer than ten sample households in the dataset, 
and one might be concerned that the sample village ownership rates are imprecise 
                                                 
11 Rong and Yao (2003) find that the improvement of public service provision stimulates the consumption 
of electric appliances in rural China. 
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estimates of their population means. To reduce this measurement error, we restrict my 
sample to villages with at least ten observations.12 Since the ownership rates vary only at 
the village level, the standard errors are corrected to allow for group effects within 
villages.  
As shown in table 2, near half of the estimates are significant at the 1% level, mostly 
with signs consistent with expectations. Higher income, greater average education and 
higher population increase a household’s likelihood to adopt a CTV. The effects of 
average age and the male ratio are insignificant. The positive effect of income is as 
expected. Higher educational levels have two effects. First, people with more education 
tend to have a higher desire for a modern life style. Second, more education implies 
easier adaptation to new technologies. More family members reduce the cost per capita 
by sharing a CTV, which increases the household’s willingness to buy. 
(Table 2) 
The estimated coefficient on 1%tvillage −  is 0.29, significant at the 1% level. This 
implies that, controlling for household characteristics and public services, in a village 
with 10% higher CTV ownership in 1997, a non-owner’s probability of making a 
purchase since 1998 would increase by 2.9%.   
BWTV households and non-BWTV households may behave differently with respect 
to the decision-making to adopt a CTV. Specifically, owning a BWTV or not may 
influence the extent of local spillovers. Take learning effects for example. Different from 
non-BWTV households, BWTV households may have accumulated some knowledge 
                                                 
12 We repeat the regressions with the sample of villages with at least 4 or 8 observations, respectively. The 
major results persist. 
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about CTV from their daily use of BWTV. To address this concern, we split the sample 
into BWTV households and non-BWTV households by whether they owned a BWTV 
before 1998, and estimate each separately. The results are reported in columns (2) and 
(3). Although the magnitude of estimated coefficients is not comparable between these 
two estimation results, their sign and significance are. There are three major differences. 
First, the age effect is positive among BWTV households; this effect turns negative for 
non-BWTV households. It seems that younger households are less likely to adopt a CTV 
if they already own a BWTV, whereas they are more likely to do so if they do not have 
one. Second, the effect of family size is positive among BWTV households, but 
insignificant among non-BWTV households. Third, the strength of TV signal stimulates 
CTV adoption among non-BWTV households, but not among BWTV households.    
Similarly, we expect local spillovers exist in the diffusion of either washing machine 
or refrigerator. Columns (4) and (5) report the estimation results on the likelihood of 
washing machine and refrigerator adoption since 1998, respectively. The estimated 
coefficients on 1%tvillage − are 0.25 and 0.34, both significant at the 1% level, indicating 
that local spillovers persist in the diffusions of various durables. 
We use the hazard function to primarily evaluate the contribution of local spillovers 
to the speed of durable diffusion. We use the adoption of washing machine to 
demonstrate. Summing up equation (1) in both sides at the village level leads to  
                    , 1
, 11
o uct
c t c c
c t
f F x x
F
λ β−
−
= + +− ，    (2) 
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in which ctf  is the adoption rate of village c starting at year t, , 1c tF −  is the washing 
machine ownership rate in village c in year 1t − . 
, 11
ct
c t
f
F −−
 therefore represents the 
hazard rate of CTV adoption since year t. Using the information in Table 1, we are able 
to calculate the adoption hazard since 1998, which turns out to be 4.6%.The ownership 
rate that a non-owner faced in 1997 is 10.2% on average. From column (4) of Table 2, we 
have 0.25λ = , thus , 1* c tFλ − =2.6%. That is, the local spillovers contribute 2.6% to the 
hazard rate 4.6%, o uc cx xβ +  contributes the rest 2.0%. If λ  accurately measures the 
spillovers, 57% (2.6% over 4.6%) of washing machine adoption starting at 1998 is due to 
the spillovers. By the same approach, we find that 31% of CTV adoptions and 56% of 
refrigerator adoptions since 1998 were due to local spillovers. For CTV, the contribution 
of local spillovers is much lower than that for other two durables. The reason may lie in 
that the extent of local spillovers is much lower for BWTV households than for non-
BWTV households as shown in columns (2) and (3) of Table 2. We will revisit this point 
in the later section. 
4.3. Estimation bias 
An alternative explanation why the estimated coefficient on 1%tvillage −  is positive is 
that 1%tvillage − is correlated with some unobserved common characteristics. First, living 
in the same economic and social environment, neighbors may develop similar 
consumption preferences. Second, higher ownership rates may be due to lower local price 
or well-developed local services. These factors would also imply that those who did not 
purchase would have a higher propensity to buy in the later time. We now use proxies 
and instrument variables to deal with these unobservables. 
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4.3.1. Control for unobservables 
If the positive coefficient on 1%tvillage −  is from the unobserved propensity to accept 
new stuff instead of local spillovers, adding variables that are correlated with an 
individual’s propensity should reduce the coefficient on 1%tvillage − . We add three 
interactions of the household characteristics (net income per capita*average years of 
education, net income per capita*average age, average years of education*average age) 
and 15 dummies for ownership of other durables at the beginning of 1998. We also add 
ownership rates of 12 durables in 1997 to capture the average propensity of households to 
adopt durables at the village level.13 It is well known that it is hard to well control for 
income effects. Including the ownership status of other durables should also help in this 
aspect. 
(Table 3) 
Table 3 reports the estimation results on the likelihood of the adoption of CTV, 
washing machine, and refrigerator, respectively. For reference, column (1) replicates the 
baseline estimation results in Table 2. The additional ownership rates are calculated 
based on the ownership status of each household within a village. To mitigate the 
colinearity, we first use family ownership status and ownership rates separately, and then 
we pool them together. Column (2) of Table 3 adds three interactions and 15 ownership 
status dummies; column (3) adds three interactions and 12 ownership rates; column (4) 
brings in all controls. Let us first discuss CTV adoptions. For BWTV households, the 
                                                 
13  For CTV adoption, the ownership rates of refrigerator, washing machine and BWTV are dropped 
because these are highly correlated with CTV ownership rates. For ownership rates of the rest 12 durables, 
their correlations with CTV ownership rates are lower than 20%. 
 14 
 
estimated coefficient on 1%tvillage −  turns insignificant with the inclusion of additional 
controls. This disappearance of the significance indicates that the former significance 
most likely comes from the failure to well control for correlated unobservables. In 
contrast, for non-BWTV households, the estimated coefficient on 1%tvillage −  only falls 
slightly, and persists significantly positive. For washing machine, the change in this 
coefficient is negligible; for refrigerator, there is a slight drop in the coefficient. In the 
last three scenarios, adding controls tends to draw down the estimated coefficient on 
1%tvillage − , but it persists significantly positive. These make us more confident that their 
estimated coefficient on 1%tvillage −  does not merely reflect its correlation with local 
unobservables. 
4.3.2. Instrument variables   
Our next strategy for dealing with unobservables is to use instrument variables. 
Instrument variables must be relevant (correlated with the village ownership rate) and 
valid (uncorrelated with the household's unobservables). Local spillovers imply that, 
conditional on its characteristics, a household should be more likely to buy its first 
durable if it is surrounded by households with characteristics favoring this durable 
ownership. For example, a low-educated household surrounded by high-educated 
households should be more likely to purchase than a low-educated household surrounded 
by low-educated households. Thus, village means as instrument variables should be 
relevant. We use five village means (average net income, average years of education, 
average age, population, male ratio) as instruments. 
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But are these village means ( 0cx ) valid, that is, are they uncorrelated with household 
unobservables ( uix )? Note that 
0
cx  is orthogonal to 
u
ix  by definition. 
u
ix  was defined as 
those unobserved characteristics that are correlated with 1%tvillage −  conditional on a 
household's observed characteristics. The part of the unobservables correlated with a 
household's observables was included in the error term, iu . Since observables are 
included in the regressions, correlation between unobservables and observables would 
bias the coefficients on these observables, but not the coefficient on 1%tvillage − . For 
example, the coefficient on the education level should incorporate any correlation 
between a household's tendency to accept new stuff and its education level. For this 
reason, village means would not be correlated with uix . Case and Katz (1991) develop 
this insight in their study on the effects of neighborhood peers on the behaviors of inner-
city youths. Goolsbee and Klenow (2002) apply this approach to examine the importance 
of local spillovers in the diffusion of home computers. Duflo and Saez (2002) also use 
this strategy when they examine individuals’ decisions about whether to enroll in a 
university-sponsored retirement plan. Admittedly, this instrument may still be invalid if 
there is a correlation between village means and the household’s unobserved propensity 
to adopt a new product even after controlling for its family characteristics. 
(Table 4) 
Table 4 reports the instrument estimation results for CTV, washing machine and 
refrigerator, respectively.14 Since we have ruled out the existence of network effects 
                                                 
14 We test the validity of our instruments. Take CTV for instance. In the first-stage regression, village 
means explain the variation of village CTV ownership rates by 15% ( 2R =0.15). Moreover, we cannot 
reject the four overidentifying restrictions at the five percent level ( 2R =0.00; 2nR =0.00; less than the 5% 
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among BWTV households for CTV adoption, we only perform IV estimation among 
non-BWTV households. Since the validity of this IV estimation also relies on how well 
correlated unobservables are controlled for, we take the estimation of column (4) in Table 
3 as the baseline. For reference, column (1) replicates the baseline estimation result. In 
column (2), we include all five village means as instruments. In column (3), we drop the 
village mean population and male ratio from the instrument set. In column (4), we only 
include the village means of average net income and average years of education in the 
instrument set. For CTV or refrigerator adoption, the estimated coefficient on 1%tvillage −  
becomes larger, and persists significant. For washing machine, its estimated coefficient 
drops, and the significance turns marginal. The increase in the coefficient when using 
instruments may be due to survivor bias (Heckman and Singer, 1985). For example, the 
only household who does not own a CTV given that everyone else in its village have 
owned one actually hates CTV. This would lead to a downward bias in the baseline 
regression. With instrument, this survivor bias is avoided, thus the estimated coefficient 
on 1%tvillage −  increases. It is unclear why this survivor bias does not influence the IV 
estimation of washing machine adoption in the similar way. To summarize, for CTV and 
refrigerator adoptions, the results of instrument estimations indicate that unobservables 
are unlikely the main reason of getting the positive estimated coefficient on 1%tvillage − . 
5. Learning effect 
 If the village% coefficient comes from local spillovers, one would like to know 
more about the channel of these spillovers. In this section, we try to determine whether 
                                                                                                                                                 
value of the 24χ  distribution.). For washing machine and refrigerator, village means as instruments also 
pass the tests mentioned above. 
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households with similar products are less influenced than others and whether education 
level plays a role. 
5.1. BWTV purchases 
If social learning is the reason behind the positive coefficient on 1%tvillage − , those 
households who are less familiar with the new product should be influenced by local 
spillovers more strongly. The uniqueness of CTV adoption is that a household may have 
had a BWTV when he makes the decision to buy a CTV.15 A BWTV functions similarly 
to a CTV. Through daily use, BWTV households should have developed some idea about 
how a CTV should work. Therefore, having a BWTV is a good proxy indicating that a 
household has better knowledge about CTV compared to those who do not have one. The 
social learning hypothesis implies that, with better knowledge, its CTV adoption decision 
should tend to be less influenced by the CTV purchases of its neighbors. In contrast, if 
local spillovers exist due to peer pressure or because of households simply imitating their 
neighbors, we should not expect much difference between these two groups. The 
estimation results are reported in Table 5. In column (1), we introduce a dummy 
indicating a household owned a BWTV before 1998, and its interaction term with CTV 
ownership rates, “ 1%tvillage − *having a BWTV”. This interaction measures how the effect 
of ownership rates differs between non-BWTV households and BWTV households. 
Because our focus is on the interaction term, we are essentially utilizing the differences-
                                                 
15 The survey data provides the information on whether a household had a BWTV at the survey time and 
the purchasing year if having one. It would not report if a household had owned a BWTV but had disposed 
it after having a CTV. Therefore, using the “having a BWTV” dummy would lead to estimation bias. To 
minimize this error, we also regress the likelihood of CTV adoption since 1999 rather than 1998. The main 
results persist. Note that the measure bias and the hypothesis point to the opposite direction. Therefore, the 
fact that we still get the expected result even with the measure bias is a support to the hypothesis that 
learning effects did exist. 
 18 
 
in-differences approach. This methodology allows us to control for local common 
unobservables down to the village level by including village dummies. This eliminates 
many of the unobservable biases, which is essential to the identification of network 
effects.16 In China, a village is of small size, with about 250 households for a typical one. 
As shown, the estimated coefficient on “ 1%tvillage − *having a BWTV” is -0.35, 
significant at the 1% level. This implies that, given everything else equal, when CTV 
ownership rates increase by 10%, the likelihood of adopting a CTV for a non-BWTV 
household would increase by 3.5% compared to a BWTV household. Therefore, our 
estimation results support the learning hypothesis that BWTV households had better 
knowledge on CTV than non-BWTV households, thus were less influenced by the CTV 
ownership status of their neighbors. Meanwhile, these results reject the hypothesis that 
local spillovers mainly come from peer pressure or simple imitation. 
(Table 5) 
Notice that our estimation results are not due to the fact that non-BWTV households 
have a higher propensity to purchase CTV than BWTV households because we have 
controlled for this effect by including the “having a BWTV” dummy. To further rule out 
the possibility that our results are due to the substitution effect of BWTV to CTV, we test 
the following implication from the substitution hypothesis. The longer the use of a 
BWTV, the more likely it would trigger an upgrade by adopting a CTV. If our results are 
due to knowledge about CTV during the process of using a BWTV, the holding period, 
once long enough, should have little influence on the estimated coefficient on 1%tvillage − . 
We repeat the estimation of column (1) with including the dummy of indicating that a 
                                                 
16 Bertrand, Luttmer and Mullainathan (2000) follow a similar approach. 
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household had owned a BWTV for more than five years and more than ten years, and 
report the results in columns (2) and (3), respectively. “ 1%tvillage − *having a BWTV” 
now measures how the effect of ownership rates differs between non-BWTV households 
and households who owned a BWTV less than five years (for column 3, it switches to ten 
year); “ 1%tvillage − *having a BWTV*owning more than five years” measures how the 
effect of ownership rates varies among households with BWTV more than five years and 
households with one less than five years (ten years for column 3). In either column (2) or 
column (3), the estimated coefficient on the last interaction term is insignificant, 
indicating that the holding length of a BWTV has no significant influence on our 
estimation results. Therefore, we further confirm that the positive coefficient on 
1%tvillage −  is unlikely due to the substitution effect of BWTV. 
5.2. Education level 
Would the education level make a difference on these local spillovers? Generally 
speaking, people with higher education level have higher learning capabilities. Therefore, 
based on the learning hypothesis, we should expect that households with higher education 
level should be more efficient to learn from their neighbors, thus more likely to take full 
advantage of this information convenience.17 To test this implication, we add the 
interaction term “ 1%tvillage − * average years of education” to the baseline regression. 
                                                 
17 Rather than being a complementary good to learning from neighbors, the education level may be a 
substitute. Including learning from neighbors, there are other channels, such as reading books, to acquire 
related information. A person with higher education may have easier access to other channels, which makes 
him rely less on learning from neighbors. However, given the convenience (low cost) and the high 
efficiency of learning from neighbors, we expect that the substitution effect of education should be weak, 
thus its complementary effect should dominate. Moreover, with the presence of substitution effects, finding 
a positive relationship between the education level and local spillovers would be a support to the hypothesis 
that the complement effects did exist. 
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Social learning implies its coefficient should be positive. Again, we include village 
dummies.  
(Table 6) 
In column (1) of Table 6, we run the regression, restricting the sample to non-
BWTV households. The estimated coefficient on “ 1%tvillage − * average education year” is 
0.05, significant at the 1% level. This indicates that households with higher education 
level are more strongly influenced by CTV ownership rates. In column (2), we regress 
among BWTV households.  The estimated coefficient on “ 1%tvillage − *average education 
years” turns insignificant. It seems that households did accumulate knowledge about 
CTV based on their daily use of BWTV; thus, learning capabilities made little difference 
among households with BWTV. This also explains our previous finding that the 
contribution of local spillovers to the diffusion speed of CTV is much lower than the 
other two durables. In columns (3) and (4), we run similar regressions for washing 
machine and refrigerator adoption, respectively. The estimated coefficient on 
“ 1%tvillage − *average education years” persists significantly positive in either case.  
For robustness check, we use another measure of education to replace average 
education years. It is the schooling of the household head. In the survey, the education 
status of the household head can take five different values. Level 1 corresponds to 
illiterate, level 2 to primary school, level 3 to junior high school, level 4 to senior high 
school and level 5 to higher education. Schooling is defined as the school years of the 
household head. Using the terminology of China's education system, illiterate 
corresponds to 0 years in school, primary school to 6 years in school, junior high school 
to 9 years in school, senior high school to 12 years in school, and higher education to 14 
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years in school. We repeat the regressions and report them in columns (5) to (8) of Table 
6. The major results persist. Therefore, we further confirm that the effect of learning 
capabilities to local spillovers in the diffusions of these three durables. 
The education effects on social learning may be non-linear. For example, it may be 
the case that literacy is essential to learn from neighbors; once above this level, additional 
education makes little contribution. To test this non-linearity, we replace the education 
measure by dummies indicating a household head is at certain education level. The 
default is illiterate. With the inclusion of 4 dummies and their interactions with 
1%tvillage − , we repeat the estimations and report in columns (9) to (12). In general, the 
estimated coefficient on each interaction is significantly positive, indicating that 
households with higher education are influenced more strongly by local spillovers, 
compared to a typical illiterate household. However, we don’t observe the pattern that the 
coefficients on interactions increase over education. This confirms our non-linear concern. 
More specifically, once the literacy capability is developed, further schooling makes little 
difference on the efficiency in this type of social learning. Different from other 
interactions terms, the significance of the coefficient on “ 1%tvillage − *associate dummy” 
is volatile across estimations. For washing machine and refrigerator, the head holding an 
associate or above degree makes the likelihood of adoption more strongly influenced by 
local spillovers, compared to other lower education level. However, for CTV, the 
estimated coefficient on “ 1%tvillage − *associate dummy” is insignificant. We only 
speculate that associate heads have accumulated some knowledge about CTV even 
without BWTV. 
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6. Conclusions 
Using the 1999 durable consumption survey data in rural China, we examined the 
importance of the role of local spillovers – including learning and network externalities – 
in durable consumption. We found that, with control for family characteristics, 
households are more likely to buy their first CTV, washing machine or refrigerator in 
villages where a large share of households already own one. In addition, for non-BWTV 
households, this local spillover is significantly positive; however, for BWTV households, 
this effect is insignificant. Furthermore, with the examination of the likelihood of 
adopting three durables, respectively, we found that the extent of local spillovers is 
positively related to the education level of households. The latest two findings are 
consistent with the hypothesis that the local spillover involves learning from neighbors. 
 As far as policy implications are concerned, the effect of public policies would be 
amplified by the local spillovers. This phenomenon is called the “social multiplier” by 
Becker and Murphy (2000). Not long ago, the Chinese government launched a series of 
subsidy policies to stimulate domestic, especially rural, consumption on durables. Such 
policies include “bringing electric appliances into rural families (jiadian xiaxiang)”, 
“bringing construction material into rural families (jiancai xiaxiang)”, and subsidizing 
the energy efficient electric appliances. The local spillovers imply that these subsidies 
would not only stimulate those who do purchase, they would also stimulate the adoption 
of potential consumers indirectly. Even after the termination of these policies, their 
stimulating effects will last for a long time because of the local spillover. Based on our 
research, the local spillovers should be stronger in the diffusion of new products.  
Therefore, the subsidy policy would be more influential if it focuses on the appliances 
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that are less popular in rural area (such as air conditioner, computer, and LCD TV). 
Similarly, subsidizing energy-efficient appliances should also have long-term stimulating 
effects. 
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Fig. 1. County CTV Adoption Rate since 1998. 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics of owners and non-owners. 
Variable CTV Washing Machine Refrigerator 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Village ownership rate in 1997  0.14   0.26   0.53  0.09  0.31  0.59  0.04   0.22   0.50  
 (0.18) (0.23) (0.26) (0.17) (0.25) (0.26) (0.10) (0.24) (0.30) 
Average net income (1,000 yuan)  1.92   2.70   2.83  2.02  2.77  2.98  2.08   3.51   3.87  
 (1.29) (1.85) (1.95) (1.42) (1.86) (2.03) (1.42) (2.39) (2.35) 
Average years of education  5.43   6.03   6.13  5.49  6.24  6.33  5.59   6.41   6.64  
 (1.92) (1.84) (1.85) (1.93) (1.78) (1.83) (1.91) (1.80) (1.87) 
Average age (100 years)  0.32   0.33   0.33  0.32  0.33  0.32  0.32   0.33   0.35  
 (0.11) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) 
Population  4.27   4.15   4.23  4.26  4.19  4.14  4.25   4.12   4.01  
 (1.22) (1.19) (1.25) (1.23) (1.20) (1.19) (1.22) (1.28) (1.24) 
Fraction male  0.52   0.54   0.52  0.52  0.54  0.52  0.52   0.54   0.53  
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.21) (0.22) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) 
Electricity price (yuan/kWh)  0.81   0.74   0.70   0.79  0.69  0.63  0.77   0.66   0.60  
 (0.29) (0.25) (0.27) (0.27) (0.21) (0.19) (0.26) (0.24) (0.2 ) 
Fraction in town  0.02   0.03   0.04  0.02  0.03  0.04  0.02   0.03   0.06  
Fraction in rural village  0.94   0.91   0.86  0.92  0.89  0.85  0.92   0.86   0.82  
Fraction with stable electricity  0.91   0.95   0.96  0.92  0.96  0.96  0.92   0.94   0.98  
Fraction with strong TV signal  0.85   0.90   0.93       
Fraction with TV tower  0.11   0.10   0.11       
Fraction with tap water    0.27 0.46 0.55    
Observations 8430 1491 3384 9754 470 2486 11692 293 954 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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Table 2 
LP estimation results on durable adoptions since 1998. 
CTV 
 
CTV 
 
BWTV 
CTV 
 
Non-BWTV
Washing 
Machine 
Refrigerator 
Variable 
（1） （2） (3) （4） （5) 
0.285*** 0.076*** 0.544*** 0.249*** 0.336*** 
1%tvillage −  (0.027) (0.022) (0.066) (0.022) (0.038) 
0.041*** 0.037*** 0.076*** 0.012*** 0.010*** Average net income (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) 
0.009*** 0.005** 0.040*** 0.004*** 0.002*** Average years of education (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) 
-0.004 0.120*** -0.229** -0.035* -0.009 Average age (0.032) (0.029) (0.092) (0.019) (0.014) 
0.016*** 0.021*** 0.002 0.008*** 0.006*** Population (0.004) (0.003) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) 
0.006 0.042** -0.034 0.019* 0.009 Fraction male (0.019) (0.019) (0.056) (0.010) (0.008) 
-0.015 -0.054* 0.019 -0.016 -0.008 Town dummy (0.046) (0.028) (0.111) (0.021) (0.018) 
-0.021 -0.014 0.004 -0.007 -0.006 Rural village dummy (0.021) (0.017) (0.059) (0.013) (0.008) 
0.015 0.021* 0.034 0.005 -0.009** Electricity stability (0.013) (0.011) (0.035) (0.006) (0.005) 
-0.075*** -0.032*** -0.190*** -0.023*** -0.016*** Electricity price (0.015) (0.011) (0.044) (0.008) (0.006) 
0.010 0.001 0.107***   Strength of TV signal (0.011) (0.010) (0.032)   
0.013 0.007 -0.034   Having TV tower (0.014) (0.012) (0.034)   
   0.008  Having tap water    (0.007)  
Observations 9863 6888 1940 10214 11982 
Adjusted R2 0.069 0.047 0.226 0.066 0.078 
Note. *, **, ***: Coefficient different from zero at 10, 5, 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 3 
More controls for unobservables. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Having other durables Y N Y 
Other durable ownership rates Baseline N Y Y 
 0.076*** 0.035 -0.004 -0.006 
CTV 1
%tvillage −  (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) 
BWTV Observations 6888 6243 6301 6243 
 Adjusted R2 0.047 0.082 0.066 0.090 
 0.544*** 0.407*** 0.445*** 0.459*** 
CTV 1
%tvillage −  (0.066) (0.068) (0.075) (0.076) 
Non-BWTV Observations 1940 1725 1921 1725 
 Adjusted R2 0.226 0.273 0.235 0.279 
0.249*** 0.232*** 0.259*** 0.262*** 
1%tvillage −  (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) 
Observations 10214 8825 9535 8825 
Washing 
Machine 
Adjusted R2 0.066 0.084 0.067 0.090 
0.336*** 0.317*** 0.305*** 0.309*** 
1%tvillage −  (0.038) (0.039) (0.042) (0.043) 
Observations 11982 10399 11171 10399 Refrigerator 
Adjusted R2 0.078 0.085 0.082 0.088 
Note. *, **, ***: Coefficient different from zero at 10, 5, 1 percent significance levels,
respectively. Household characteristics and village characteristics are included. 
 
 30
Table 4 
IV estimations. 
 
  IV: Village means 
 
Baseline 
IV 
5 village means
IV 
Deleting 
population and 
fraction male 
IV 
Deleting average age, 
population, and 
fraction mal 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1%tvillage −  0.459*** 1.671*** 1.720*** 2.008*** 
CTV (Non-BWTV) (0.076) (0.518) (0.535) (0.589) 
   Observations 1725 1725 1725 1725 
1%tvillage −  0.262*** 0.149 0.126 0.152 
Washing Machine (0.025) (0.147) (0.146) (0.145) 
    Observations 8825 8825 8825 8825 
1%tvillage −  0.309*** 0.515*** 0.445** 0.549* 
Refrigerator     (0.043) (0.196) (0.208) (0.294) 
    Observations 10399 10399 10399 10399 
Note. *, **, ***: Coefficient different from zero at 10, 5, 1 percent significance levels, respectively. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. Household characteristics and village characteristics are included. 
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Table 5 
The interaction effects with having a BWTV or not. 
CTV 
Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Having a BWTV  -0.349*** -0.349*** -0.349*** 
  (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
1%tvillage − * Having a BWTV  -0.315*** -0.334*** -0.325*** 
  (0.046) (0.060) (0.046) 
1%tvillage − * Having a BWTV    0.025  
*More than 5 years   (0.047)  
1%tvillage − * Having a BWTV     0.048 
*More than 10 years    (0.045) 
Observations  8828 8828 8828 
Adjusted R2  0.334 0.334 0.334 
Note. *, **, ***: Coefficient different from zero at 10, 5, 1 percent significance levels, 
respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. For all regressions, village dummies are 
included. 
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Table 6 
The interaction effects with education level. 
CTV 
No-BWTV BWTV 
Washing 
Machine Refrigerator Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1%tvillage −  0.044*** -0.004 0.026*** 0.043*** 
*Average education years (0.016) (0.006) (0.007) (0.012) 
Observations 1940 6888 10214 11982 
Adjusted R2 0.389 0.120 0.174 0.183 
     
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
1%tvillage −  0.033*** -0.001 0.018*** 0.020*** 
*Education years of the head (0.013) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) 
Observations 1940 6888 10214 11982 
Adjusted R2 0.386 0.120 0.172 0.179 
     
 (9) (10) (11) (12) 
1%tvillage −  0.283* 0.012 0.145*** 0.319*** 
*Elementary dummy (0.146) (0.052) (0.054) (0.091) 
1%tvillage −  0.338** -0.014 0.174*** 0.193** 
*Junior  high dummy (0.150) (0.044) (0.056) (0.075) 
1%tvillage −  0.331** -0.021 0.169** 0.247** 
*Senior  high dummy (0.159) (0.071) (0.073) (0.110) 
1%tvillage −  -0.023 -0.074 0.899* 0.717* 
*Associate dummy (1.040) (0.323) (0.461) (0.372) 
Observations 1940 6888 10214 11982 
Adjusted R2 0.385 0.120 0.173 0.182 
Note. *, **, ***: Coefficient different from zero at 10, 5, 1 percent significance levels,
respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. For all regressions, village dummies are included. 
 
 
 
 
